More abstracts coming soon...
Delia Belleri (University of Vienna)
A Methodological Challenge to Deflationary Ontology
In recent years, several authors have embraced an approach to ontology whereby answers to questions of the form "Are there Fs?" are reached via methods that are supposed to be epistemically unproblematic: mainly analytic inferences based on semantic information or empirical observation. This approach is called by Amie Thomasson "Easy Ontology"; practitioners of this method include Thomasson, but also arguably Schiffer and Hale & Wright. The aim of this talk to identify a tension in some ways of implementing this methodology. The tension arises from the fact that some easy ontologists (e.g. Thomasson or Hale & Wright) wish to employ epistemically "safe" methods but at the same time wish to be realists in a way that is sufficiently in continuity with more inflationary forms of realism. I argue that an aspiration to combine these two factors (i) either produces an excessive change in the practice of ontology, whereby it is not clear whether the easy ontologist is engaged in the same kind of project as that pursued by inflationary theories; (ii) or gives rise to epistemic difficulties analogous to those encountered by inflationary ontology.
Esa Diaz-Leon (University of Barcelona)
Substantive Metaphysical Debates about Gender and Race: Verbal Disputes and Metaphysical Deflationism
In this paper I aim to discuss several proposals about the meta-metaphysics of gender and race, that is, proposals about what debates in the metaphysics of gender and race are really about. In particular, I will examine several claims about what makes a dispute in metaphysics a genuine or substantive dispute, as opposed to a non-substantive one, and I will argue, first, that these claims have the consequence that certain debates about the nature of gender and race would count as non-substantive disputes, and second, that this is problematic, and hence we have reasons to revise our use of the label “substantive metaphysical debate” in a way so that it includes those debates about the nature of gender and race. That is to say, my main claim in this paper belongs to what has been called an ameliorative project, or a project in conceptual ethics, that is, a project about what terms and concepts we ought to use, as opposed to the so-called descriptive project of finding out what our terms actually mean. In addition, I will suggest that we could understand debates about the existence and nature of gender and race in terms of disputes about how we actually use or should use gender and racial terms, and that normative considerations, including moral and political considerations, could be relevant with regards to both kinds of disputes.
Matti Eklund (University of Uppsala)
Personites and Existence
Mark Johnston and Eric Olson have both pressed what Johnston has dubbed the personite problem. Personites, if they exist, are person-like entities whose lives extend over a continuous proper part of a person’s life. They are so person-like that they seem to have moral status if persons do. But this threatens to wreak havoc with ordinary moral thinking. For example, simple decisions to suffer some short-term hardship for long-term benefits become problematic. And ordinary punishment is always also punishment of the innocent, since it punishes personites that didn’t exist when the crime was committed. An initially attractive way around the personite problem may be to simply deny that personites exist. But as I discuss in this talk, relating to contemporary discussions in metaontology (the doctrine of quantifier variance, and Ted Sider’s ontological realism), this response actually doesn’t work. The problems I discuss illustrate the significance of metaontological considerations for issues in ethics and metaethics, and promise to generalize beyond the personite problem. Along the way, I also discuss the relationship between the issues brought up, and the other main deflationary approach in metaontology besides quantifier variance, involving accepting an extremely liberal ontology.
Jade Fletcher (University of Leeds)
Truth for Metaontological Deflationists
The purpose of this paper is to investigate and recommend the conception of truth that a metaontological deflationist should prefer. Ultimately I contend that the notion at work in broadly interpretationist approaches to content best serves their theoretical needs. To orientate my discussion I draw upon two current metaontological deflationist positions: the neo-Fregeanism of Bob Hale, and the neo-Carnapianism of Amie Thomasson. I argue that my recommendation is the best candidate for the metaontological deflationist, given two important requirements of their positions that I identify.
David Liggins (University of Manchester)
Higher-order deflationism
Nicholas K. Jones has recently explored the implications of quantification into predicate position for the metaphysics of properties ('Nominalist realism', Noûs, forthcoming). Jones argues that if we regard quantification into predicate position as a sui generis form of quantification that cannot be understood as a disguised form of first-order quantification, then the debate over the existence of properties is radically reconfigured. In this talk I relate Jones's ideas to Amie L. Thomasson’s 'easy approach' to ontology and offer some critical questions for Jones
Amie Thomasson (Dartmouth College)
Conceptual Ethics and the Work of Metaphysics
Metaontological deflationists who pursue ‘easy ontology’ treat questions about existence or metaphysical modality as answerable by a combination of conceptual and empirical means, and thereby avoid the epistemological mysteries of serious metaphysics. But they face a remaining problem—for they seem unable to account for the sense that many areas of metaphysics seem to be engaged in a deep, difficult, and worldly enterprise.
I have argued that deflationists can and should allow that work of deep metaphysics often has been and certainly can be involved in normative conceptual work—work in determining what concepts we should use and how we should use them. This view still enables us to demystify the epistemology of metaphysics, while preserving a sense of the difficulty, depth, and importance of much work we do in metaphysics.
But a challenge remains. For serious metaphysicians are prone to think that we must again do metaphysics to properly engage in conceptual choice—since our choices should be guided by what the world is like. In this paper, I compare metaphysics-first approaches to conceptual choice with more purely pragmatic approaches. I argue that the metaphysical approach to conceptual choice leaves us again in epistemological mystery. I then turn to develop the pragmatic approach in a way that respects intuitions that the world has structure, that some conceptual choices can be objectively better than others, and that conceptual choice needn’t be just arbitrary or power-driven. As long as a plausible pragmatic approach is available, the deflationist can solve her problem and legitimately turn to conceptual ethics to capture what is deep, important, and interesting in the work of metaphysics.
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Delia Belleri (University of Vienna)
A Methodological Challenge to Deflationary Ontology
In recent years, several authors have embraced an approach to ontology whereby answers to questions of the form "Are there Fs?" are reached via methods that are supposed to be epistemically unproblematic: mainly analytic inferences based on semantic information or empirical observation. This approach is called by Amie Thomasson "Easy Ontology"; practitioners of this method include Thomasson, but also arguably Schiffer and Hale & Wright. The aim of this talk to identify a tension in some ways of implementing this methodology. The tension arises from the fact that some easy ontologists (e.g. Thomasson or Hale & Wright) wish to employ epistemically "safe" methods but at the same time wish to be realists in a way that is sufficiently in continuity with more inflationary forms of realism. I argue that an aspiration to combine these two factors (i) either produces an excessive change in the practice of ontology, whereby it is not clear whether the easy ontologist is engaged in the same kind of project as that pursued by inflationary theories; (ii) or gives rise to epistemic difficulties analogous to those encountered by inflationary ontology.
Esa Diaz-Leon (University of Barcelona)
Substantive Metaphysical Debates about Gender and Race: Verbal Disputes and Metaphysical Deflationism
In this paper I aim to discuss several proposals about the meta-metaphysics of gender and race, that is, proposals about what debates in the metaphysics of gender and race are really about. In particular, I will examine several claims about what makes a dispute in metaphysics a genuine or substantive dispute, as opposed to a non-substantive one, and I will argue, first, that these claims have the consequence that certain debates about the nature of gender and race would count as non-substantive disputes, and second, that this is problematic, and hence we have reasons to revise our use of the label “substantive metaphysical debate” in a way so that it includes those debates about the nature of gender and race. That is to say, my main claim in this paper belongs to what has been called an ameliorative project, or a project in conceptual ethics, that is, a project about what terms and concepts we ought to use, as opposed to the so-called descriptive project of finding out what our terms actually mean. In addition, I will suggest that we could understand debates about the existence and nature of gender and race in terms of disputes about how we actually use or should use gender and racial terms, and that normative considerations, including moral and political considerations, could be relevant with regards to both kinds of disputes.
Matti Eklund (University of Uppsala)
Personites and Existence
Mark Johnston and Eric Olson have both pressed what Johnston has dubbed the personite problem. Personites, if they exist, are person-like entities whose lives extend over a continuous proper part of a person’s life. They are so person-like that they seem to have moral status if persons do. But this threatens to wreak havoc with ordinary moral thinking. For example, simple decisions to suffer some short-term hardship for long-term benefits become problematic. And ordinary punishment is always also punishment of the innocent, since it punishes personites that didn’t exist when the crime was committed. An initially attractive way around the personite problem may be to simply deny that personites exist. But as I discuss in this talk, relating to contemporary discussions in metaontology (the doctrine of quantifier variance, and Ted Sider’s ontological realism), this response actually doesn’t work. The problems I discuss illustrate the significance of metaontological considerations for issues in ethics and metaethics, and promise to generalize beyond the personite problem. Along the way, I also discuss the relationship between the issues brought up, and the other main deflationary approach in metaontology besides quantifier variance, involving accepting an extremely liberal ontology.
Jade Fletcher (University of Leeds)
Truth for Metaontological Deflationists
The purpose of this paper is to investigate and recommend the conception of truth that a metaontological deflationist should prefer. Ultimately I contend that the notion at work in broadly interpretationist approaches to content best serves their theoretical needs. To orientate my discussion I draw upon two current metaontological deflationist positions: the neo-Fregeanism of Bob Hale, and the neo-Carnapianism of Amie Thomasson. I argue that my recommendation is the best candidate for the metaontological deflationist, given two important requirements of their positions that I identify.
David Liggins (University of Manchester)
Higher-order deflationism
Nicholas K. Jones has recently explored the implications of quantification into predicate position for the metaphysics of properties ('Nominalist realism', Noûs, forthcoming). Jones argues that if we regard quantification into predicate position as a sui generis form of quantification that cannot be understood as a disguised form of first-order quantification, then the debate over the existence of properties is radically reconfigured. In this talk I relate Jones's ideas to Amie L. Thomasson’s 'easy approach' to ontology and offer some critical questions for Jones
Amie Thomasson (Dartmouth College)
Conceptual Ethics and the Work of Metaphysics
Metaontological deflationists who pursue ‘easy ontology’ treat questions about existence or metaphysical modality as answerable by a combination of conceptual and empirical means, and thereby avoid the epistemological mysteries of serious metaphysics. But they face a remaining problem—for they seem unable to account for the sense that many areas of metaphysics seem to be engaged in a deep, difficult, and worldly enterprise.
I have argued that deflationists can and should allow that work of deep metaphysics often has been and certainly can be involved in normative conceptual work—work in determining what concepts we should use and how we should use them. This view still enables us to demystify the epistemology of metaphysics, while preserving a sense of the difficulty, depth, and importance of much work we do in metaphysics.
But a challenge remains. For serious metaphysicians are prone to think that we must again do metaphysics to properly engage in conceptual choice—since our choices should be guided by what the world is like. In this paper, I compare metaphysics-first approaches to conceptual choice with more purely pragmatic approaches. I argue that the metaphysical approach to conceptual choice leaves us again in epistemological mystery. I then turn to develop the pragmatic approach in a way that respects intuitions that the world has structure, that some conceptual choices can be objectively better than others, and that conceptual choice needn’t be just arbitrary or power-driven. As long as a plausible pragmatic approach is available, the deflationist can solve her problem and legitimately turn to conceptual ethics to capture what is deep, important, and interesting in the work of metaphysics.
.